Abstract: This paper experimentally evaluates the effects of public per-student subsidies to local partnering entrepreneurs to establish and operate tuition-free, coeducational private primary schools in educationally underserved rural communities in Sindh province, Pakistan. Two different subsidy structures were tested, one in which the subsidy amount did not differ by the student's gender, and the other in which the subsidy amount was higher for female students. The latter structure was motivated by the interest of the program administrators to correct for the existing gender disparity in school enrollment in the general setting. The program increased school enrollment by 30 percentage points in treated communities, for both boys and girls. The gender-differentiated subsidy structure did not produce a greater increase in female enrollment than the gender-uniform one. The program increased test scores by 0.67 standard deviations in treated communities. Program schools proved more effective in raising test scores than government schools in the geographic vicinity, with program students scoring 0.16 standard deviations higher, despite coming from more socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds. Structural estimations of the supply and demand for schooling suggest nearly efficient choices on school inputs by the program administrators and partnering entrepreneurs.
We also examine the efficiency of the input choices made by SEF and program-school operators vis-à-vis the social planner's solution, based on structural model estimations of schooling demand and education production. Using information about household choices, we first estimate a demand model for school inputs.
We then use these estimates to bound the costs of school inputs. The intuition is that for schools which provide a given input, the benefit must have exceeded the cost of the input, in terms of additional enrollment.
Conversely, for schools without that input, the opposite must be true. Finally, we estimate an educationproduction function relating test scores to school inputs and student characteristics. We compute the optimal set of school inputs that a social planner would have chosen, combining the profits obtained by programschool operators, the surplus accruing to students, and the social benefit of education.
We find that SEF and program-school operators did remarkably well in choosing school inputs, capturing approximately 90 percent of the total amount of possible surplus. The main differences between the program schools' and social planner's solutions are that the latter requires schools to have toilets and drinking water, and employs less-experienced, but more-educated, teachers. The social planner also better matches the gender ratio of teachers with that of children in the village.
Pakistan and the PPRS Program

Schooling in Pakistan
School enrollment is low in Pakistan, even when compared to countries with a similar income level . At the time the PPRS program was initiated in 2009, the primary-school net enrollment rate (NER) for children aged 6-10 in Pakistan was 67 percent (72 percent for boys and 62 percent for girls) (Government of Pakistan, 2009). 1 In rural Sindh, where the PPRS program was implemented, the primary-school NER was 56 percent for children aged 6-10. The gender disparity was even wider, with a primary-school NER of 65 percent for boys and 46 percent for girls (Government of Pakistan, 2009).
Pakistan has witnessed a dramatic growth in private schools. 2 The number of private schools increased from around 4,000 in the early 1980s to 36,000 in 2000 to 47,000 in 2005; much of the expansion in the 1990s and 2000s occurred in villages and poorer urban neighborhoods (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja, 2008) . By 2010-11, one-fifth of children aged 6-15 in Pakistan were enrolled in private school (or one-third of students,
given the large share of unenrolled children) (Nguyen and Raju, 2015) . These schools have succeeded both in terms of cost and quality. At less than $20 in 2000, the mean annual cost of private primary school fees represented about two percent of mean total household spending (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja, 2008) . Low fees were enabled by few fixed costs, and low operational costs, specifically low teacher wages. Discussed in the next section, low-cost private schools are also found to produce higher test scores than government schools in rural Punjab province (Andrabi et al., 2010 (Andrabi et al., , 2011 ).
However, large spatial differences exist in private-school enrollment rates across Pakistan. Thirty percent of primary-school students were in private schools in the country, compared to only 5% in rural Sindh in 2008-09 (Government of Sindh, 2009). Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2008) find that, as in the rest of the country, private schools in rural Sindh tended to be found in larger villages with better infrastructure. They argue that the main constraint to the further expansion of low-cost private schools is the lack of a local supply of women with secondary education who can be hired as teachers. 
Program
To address education access, equity, and quality challenges in Sindh, the provincial government in 2007 initiated the Sindh Education Sector Reform Program (SERP), a multifaceted reform of public spending and provision in primary and secondary education. Public-private partnerships in education, entailing public financing and private provision, was a key component of SERP, aimed at increasing access to schooling and the quality of education for socioeconomically disadvantaged children.
Funded by the provincial government, the Promoting Private Schooling in Rural Sindh (PPRS) program was designed and administered by the Sindh Education Foundation (SEF), a semi-autonomous organization established in 1992 by the provincial government to undertake education initiatives targeting less-developed areas and marginalized populations in Sindh province. The program was a notable example of SEF's innovative approach to extending educational access. The main, stated objectives of the PPRS program were to increase access to schooling in marginalized areas, to reduce the gender disparity in school enrollment, and to increase student learning, in a cost-effective manner.
The first phase of the program, which we evaluate in this study, was implemented in eight (out of, at that time, 23) districts in the province. SEF selected the districts based on how they ranked in terms of the size of the out-of-school child population, the gender disparity in school enrollment, and the percentage of households located at least 15 minutes away from the nearest primary school. The eight poorest-ranked districts were selected, excluding those that were viewed by the provincial government and SEF as experiencing heightened law-and-order concerns.
4 3 Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2013) find that villages with government secondary schools for girls were much more likely to see low-cost private primary schools arise in later years. They argue that the main channel is the local supply of women with secondary education. These women can be hired as teachers at low wages, as they face limited alternative employment opportunities and restrictions on their geographic mobility. 4 The district rankings were determined using district-representative data from the 2006-07 Pakistan Social and Living in the selected districts. The main benefits that program-school operators received included a per-student cash subsidy; free school leadership and teacher training; and free textbooks, other teaching and learning materials, stationery, and bookbags.
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Two types of monthly per-student subsidies were provided: a gender-uniform subsidy, where the school received 350 rupees (approximately $5 in annualized 2008 US dollars) for each student; and a genderdifferentiated subsidy, where the school received 350 rupees for each male student and 450 rupees ($6.4) for each female student. A total of 100 schools received the gender-uniform subsidy, and another 100 schools, the gender-differentiated subsidy. All schools received the other benefits.
The subsidy amounts were set at less than one-half of the per-student cost in public primary and secondary government schools in the province, and were not adjusted for price inflation over the evaluation period. 6 Provided on a quarterly basis, a school's total subsidy was linked to the number of children in attendance multiplied by 1.25 to reflect an expected 20-percent student-absence rate. SEF gathered attendance information through periodic, unannounced monitoring visits to program schools.
Local private entrepreneurs were invited to apply to the program through an open call in newspapers, and to propose educationally underserved villages in the selected districts to establish and operate schools. SEF vetted the applications (ultimately, through visits to shortlisted villages) based on several criteria, including written assent from the parents of at least 75 children of primary-school ages that they would enroll their children in the school, should it be established; a school site in the village that was located at least 1.5
kilometers from the nearest other school; a building of sufficient size; and the identification of teachers with a minimum of eight years of schooling (middle school completion), with at least two being female. 7 Once in the program, school operators would continue to receive the subsidy and other benefits, as long as they provided free schooling to children, and provided and maintained school infrastructure and the schooling environment consistent with SEF guidelines. SEF strictly enforced the free-schooling condition, but was more lenient in enforcing the school infrastructural features and environmental conditions.
Standards Measurement Survey (Government of Pakistan, 2007). 5 The subsidies were transferred electronically to the bank accounts of the private entrepreneurs. 6 Per-student costs in government schools were based on information from the provincial Education and Literacy Department's annual census of government schools and the provincial Finance Department's records on recurrent budgets and expenditures toward primary and secondary education.
7 SEF viewed eight years of schooling as sufficiently high that teachers would have the competency to teach primary school content, but low enough that qualified individuals could be found locally.
In the basic human-capital acquisition model (Becker, 1962) , households compare the present and future costs and benefits of educating their children. School fees and transportation costs, both in terms of direct payments and time, tend to be the largest costs of primary schooling for households. The PPRS program reduces the cost of transportation by situating schools in underserved villages, and reduces school fees by providing free schooling. The immediate effect of these two changes should be an increase in household demand for schooling, and, thus, higher school enrollment.
International evidence on the effects of distance from home to school on enrollment is strong, from experimental evaluations (Burde and Linden, 2013) as well as from quasi-experimental evaluations (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996; Duflo, 2001 ; Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler, 2009) These studies find that when schools are introduced into underserved areas, household demand for schooling increases, often substantially.
Consistent with this evidence, Carneiro, Das, and Reis (2016) estimate household demand for alternative primary schooling choices (private and government schools) in rural Punjab, Pakistan, and find that the strongest determinant is distance from home to school. International evidence for the effects of free schooling on household demand for schooling is also strong, suggesting a negative association between price and enrollment (Deininger, 2003 As another supply-side element, the enrollment-related subsidy structure incentivizes program-school operators to take measures to attract children to enroll in school. This feature is strengthened for girls in the gender-differentiated subsidy structure, which potentially incentivizes private-school operators to take stronger measures to draw girls, for example, through employing female teachers, providing safe transportation and a safe schooling environment, or even offering a small, conditional cash transfer to girls.
The positive effects on enrollment from interventions that reduce the cost of enrolling in school contrast with the mixed effects of the interventions on student learning, as measured through test scores. For example, early, international evidence from conditional cash-transfer programs suggests that exposure to (more) schooling does not necessarily produce higher test scores (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Saavedra and García, 2012) . More recently, international evidence points to positive effects on test scores, although the results depend crucially on the specific design components of each individual program (Barham, Macours, and Maluccio, 2013; Barrera-Osorio and Filmer, 2015) . To address the challenge of raising test scores, the program offered training on school leadership and teaching, and supplied teaching and learning materials, both free of cost. The program also supported local private entrepreneurs to establish and operate schools (rather than SEF doing so itself). Program-school operators had greater flexibility than government schools to determine their input mix and to account for specific local conditions of the communities and demands from households (Hoxby, 2003 ; MacLeod and Urquiola, 2012), and were potentially more accountable to the households that they served (World Bank, 2004 ).
An influential literature argues for the potential gains from private schooling (Friedman, 1955; Hoxby, 2003 ; MacLeod and Urquiola, 2012). Evidence exists for Pakistan on the relative effectiveness of private versus government schools. Using an instrumental-variables approach, Andrabi et al. (2010) find that lowcost private schools in rural Punjab have large, positive effects on test scores and civic knowledge among primary-school students. They attribute this to the fact that private schools adjust their inputs to meet local conditions, whereas government schools do not. In the same setting, Andrabi et al. (2011) also examine the effects of enrollment in low-cost private schools on test scores, based on data for students who switch from government to private schools, and vice versa. They find that students who move from government to private schools see a large gain in test scores shortly after moving, while those who move from private to government schools see a large decline. The estimated effects from these studies may, however, be biased due to demand-side selection into private schools by households and supply-side selection of students by schools.
These forms of selection make it difficult to disentangle the effect of school effectiveness from that of the composition of students in terms of ability.
An important source of rigorous evidence on private-school effectiveness comes from studies of privateschool voucher programs in developing countries. Based on vouchers offered through lotteries to low-income, government-school students for private secondary schooling in Colombia, Angrist et al. (2002) find positive effects of private-school enrollment on several outcomes, including grade progression and test scores. However, these effects potentially reflect both private-school effectiveness and incentivized student effort. 8 Randomly assigning vouchers at the village and household levels to government-school students for private primary schooling in India, Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) find that private schools are highly cost-effective in raising test scores. They also find that private schools are more responsive in terms of matching what's taught to household demand, reallocating time away from subjects such as reading and mathematics, towards English, Hindi, science, and social studies. 9 In addition, the study did not find spillover effects on governmentschool students who were not assigned vouchers, nor students initially enrolled in private schools, in program villages.
This study is also linked to the literature on PPP programs in education (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, and Guáqueta, 2009). Although these programs share many of the theoretical justifications discussed in 8 In addition to enabling private-school enrollment, the program stipulated that students would lose their vouchers if their grades fell below a certain level. 9 Test scores for Telugu and mathematics remained the same, despite significantly less time being spent on these topics; while time allocated towards other topics yielded test-score improvements.
the private-school voucher literature (for example, private-school effectiveness, market competition), they differ in important ways. Most conspicuously, PPPs enable higher-quality education for beneficiary students through the terms of the contract between the program school and the government, with some programs regulating school inputs (including teachers), and others selecting program schools based on measures of quality.
However, PPP programs may be structured such that they lose the market-based accountability mechanisms at play in the private-school market. Schools under PPP programs may be less effective than nonprogram private schools in such cases. For example, some PPP programs require that schools offer free education, as is the case with the PPRS program. This condition cancels out the role that prices play in informing market participants of the relative efficiencies of producers and the preferences of consumers (Hayek, 1945) . 10 The effect of PPP programs on learning then is theoretically ambiguous. program school. The household survey collected information on the household, the household head, and on each child aged 5-9. In each village, the baseline survey also consisted of a survey of the entrepreneur and proposed teachers, as well as physical checks by the survey interviewers of the proposed school site and building. GPS data were collected from all schools, the proposed program-school site, and surveyed households.
The follow-up survey consisted of three instruments: a school survey; a household survey; and a child survey, which included a test. The household and child surveys, and child tests, were administered at the child's home. The household survey was administered to households with at least one child aged 5-9. In large villages, up to 42 randomly sampled households in the village were interviewed; in villages with fewer than 42 households, which comprised the majority, all households in the village were interviewed. The survey was multi-topic, and had extensive modules on past and current schooling and other activities for children aged 5-17, answered by the household head or another primary adult household member.
A child survey was administered to each child aged 5-9. It asked questions mainly on work activities performed inside and outside the home, past and current schooling, and aspirations. Each child was then administered tests on language (either Urdu or Sindhi, as preferred) and mathematics.
The school survey gathered information from interviews of head teachers and all other teachers, and visual checks by the survey interviewers of school infrastructural and environmental conditions. The survey also collected student attendance information through a headcount, with the attendance lists used during the household survey to verify the child's enrollment status reported by the household. GPS data was gathered from all surveyed households and schools. Table 1 reports sample sizes of the baseline and follow-up surveys, by treatment status. The baseline survey interviewed 2,089 households and 5,556 children aged 5-9, and the follow-up survey interviewed 5,966 households and 17,720 children aged 5-17.
Empirical strategy
The primary outcomes of interest are child enrollment and test scores. We estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) based on the following specification:
where Y i is the outcome of interest for child i, T i is an indicator variable indicating whether child i resides in a village assigned a program school, and X i is a vector of child and household controls. In other specifications, we examine the differential impacts of the program by gender, by the two subsidy treatments, and by the two subsidy treatments interacted with gender. Standard errors are clustered at the village level, j.
Internal validity: The validity of our results depends upon the comparability of populations across the experimental groups. Because the program was randomly assigned across villages, treatment status should be orthogonal to household and child characteristics that might be correlated with the outcomes. Insofar as this holds, it will be sufficient to compare outcomes across the treatment and control groups to evaluate the impacts of the program.
To assess comparability, we estimate the differences in mean household and child characteristics between program and control villages, at baseline and follow-up. In table 2, columns (1) and (3) report mean characteristics in control villages, at baseline and follow-up, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) report the differences in mean characteristics between program and control villages, at baseline and follow-up, respectively.
Differences in means in virtually all household and child characteristics between program and control villages were small and statistically insignificant. As an exception, the percentage of girls in program villages was slightly higher (4.2 percentage points and 3.0 percentage points at baseline and follow-up, respectively).
Analogously structured to table 2, appendix table A1 reports the differences in mean household and child characteristics between villages under the gender-uniform and -differentiated subsidy treatments. Differences in mean characteristics between the two subsidy treatments were small, and always statistically insignificant.
Program impacts
Enrollment
School enrollment information was collected in two ways. First, the household survey respondent was asked whether the child was enrolled during the just-concluded school term. Second, the enrollment of the child aged 5-10 in a given school was verified using a student attendance list compiled through a headcount conducted during the school survey. 11 We discuss results based on both reported and verified enrollment measures. Table 3 reports the pooled-treatment impacts on school enrollment and grade attainment. Panels A and B report results for young children (aged 5-10) and older children (aged 11-17), respectively. Columns (1) through (4) report impacts on reported enrollment, with different sets of controls. Columns (5) and (6) report impacts on verified enrollment and grade attained, respectively, with the full set of controls. Based on the model with the full set of controls, the pooled treatment increased reported enrollment among young children by 31.5 percentage points, and verified enrollment by 29.4 percentage points. In addition, the pooled treatment increased attainment by 0.4 grades.
While older children were not the expressed target population for the program, we nonetheless find significant increases in reported enrollment for them. The program increased reported school enrollment among older children by 11.0 percentage points. We do not find an impact on grade attainment for these children. The reason for this is a combination of the smaller impact on enrollment, as well as the fact that the older children were enrolling in the grades offered in program schools, which were at the primary level.
Test Scores
Test scores for children aged 5-9 are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation in control villages. Table 4 reports the impacts of the pooled treatment on test scores. Columns (1) through (4) report impacts, with various sets of controls. Based on the model with the full set of controls, the pooled treatment increases total test scores by 0.63 standard deviations. The impacts were similar for both subject test scores.
We also estimate the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) impact of reported and verified enrollment on test scores (reported in columns (5) and (6), respectively). For these estimates, we regress the respective enrollment measure on pooled-treatment status in the first stage, and regress test scores on predicted enrollment in the second stage. The program increased total test scores by two standard deviations among children induced by the program to enroll in school. The impacts were similar for both subject test scores. The results suggest that program schools were highly effective in imparting basic numeracy and literacy skills to students.
Differential impacts on school enrollment and test scores
We examine the impacts of the two subsidy treatments (table 5, panel A), the impacts of the pooled treatment by gender (table 5, panel B), and the impacts of the two subsidy treatments by gender (table 6) , based on models with the full set of controls. We do not find differential impacts by subsidy treatment, by gender, or by subsidy treatment and gender.
Aspirations
Given the impacts on school enrollment and test scores, it is unsurprising that households may have adjusted their aspirations. In table 7, panel A reports impacts on aspirations for each child aged 5-17 conveyed by the household, and panel B, on those conveyed by each child aged 5-9. Column (1) reports means in control villages, and column (2) reports the differences in means between program and control villages. We also examine gender differential impacts on aspirations. Columns (3), (4), and (5) report regression coefficients for girls, the program, and the interaction of the two, respectively.
Relative to their counterparts in control villages, program-village households were more likely to desire that their boys become doctors (+5.8 percentage points) and engineers (+2.6 percentage points), and less likely to desire that they become security personnel (-5.0 percentage points). They were also more likely to desire that their girls become teachers (+6.5 percentage points), and less likely to desire that they become housewives (-14.9 percentage points). Program-village households desired higher attainment for their boys and girls (+1.5 and +1.7 years, respectively). In terms of age of marriage, program-village households had similar preferences to control-village households, for boys and girls.
Program-village boys were more likely to desire public sector employment (+12.2 percentage points).
Program-village children did not desire more years of education than control-village children. However, children in both program and control villages desired more years of education than was desired by households The scale-up of the program during the evaluation period also affected how cleanly we could assign costs to phase-1 program schools. The cost data allow us to distinguish between subsidy costs for phase-1 and phase-2 program schools, but we could not separate out other types of costs in the same way. The cost data for fiscal year 2010-11 include early expenses for administering a third phase of entry into the program, which we also could not separate out. Given this, for the cost-effectiveness calculation, we simply treat nonsubsidy costs to be fully assigned to phase-1 program schools. In addition, in July and August 2010, Sindh experienced major floods, and some schools were damaged or their operations were disrupted. SEF incurred costs helping to rehabilitate schools and restore school operations. The assignment of total non-subsidy costs to phase-1 schools raises costs used in the cost-effectiveness calculation. The natural disaster also raises costs relative to what could be expected in more normal times. These two factors would work to bias downwards the cost-effectiveness of the program. (2) and (5) report the differences in mean characteristics between program and government schools. Columns (3) and (6) Based on information from head teachers, we find that program schools were staffed with more teachers than government schools (+1 teachers), with a larger number of teachers being female (+1.5 teachers). A greater number of teachers at program schools had either less than five years of teaching experience (+2.5 teachers) or 5-10 years of teaching experience (+0.4 teachers), and fewer had more than 10 years of teaching experience (-2 teachers).
Finally, based on information from individual teachers, we find that program-school teachers were more likely to be female (+24.3 percentage points); they were younger (-13.6 years), and received lower monthly salaries (-11,454 rupees). In addition, program-school teachers had fewer years of teaching experience (-11.3 years). Program-school teachers spent a similar amount of time engaged in various classroom activities as government-school teachers, save for an additional 0.9 hours per week testing children, and an additional 0.6 hours per week teaching small groups.
In appendix table A2, columns (1) and (3) report the mean characteristics in program schools under the gender-uniform subsidy treatment, and columns (2) and (4) report the differences in mean characteristics between program schools under the gender-uniform and -differentiated subsidy treatments. We do not find that program-school operators under the gender-differentiated subsidy treatment had structured their schools differently from their counterparts under the gender-uniform one. The absence of differential impacts on girls' school enrollment and test scores across the two subsidy treatments discussed earlier is in line with the findings here.
Quality
One reason for the program's public-private partnership design was to take advantage of the potential privateschool effect on test scores, for which evidence is found for low-cost private schools in larger, more-developed villages in Pakistan (Andrabi et al., 2010 (Andrabi et al., , 2011 . The operator had flexibility in how to structure and run the program school around guidelines provided-but applied leniently-by SEF. To determine whether the private-school effect on test scores exists for program schools, we compare mean test scores of proximate government (and private) schools, and program schools.
In table 9, column (1) reports the mean test score for program schools, columns (2) and (3) report the difference in mean test scores between program schools and the indicated school type, and column (4) reports the p-value from a test of the difference in mean test scores between government and private schools.
Program schools scored 0.17 standard deviations higher on the total test than government schools (0.20 standard deviations higher in the mathematics test, and 0.12 standard deviations higher in the language test). In contrast, differences in mean test scores between program and private schools were small (about 0.01-0.02 standard deviations) and statistically insignificant.
These comparisons do not causally identify differences in quality between school types, as studentcomposition effects are likely to bias these estimates. If program schools attract students who would not otherwise have been enrolled, and because these students come from more socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds, the program-school effect on test scores may be biased downwards. If, however, governmentschool students are enrolling in program schools, and these students are more advantaged than other children in the village, the program-school effect may be biased upwards. Although it cannot be ruled out, we do not find clear evidence supporting the latter possibility. Appendix table A3 reports differences in mean household and child characteristics by school type. As column (2) shows, program-school students were younger, enrolled in a lower grade, and had first enrolled at a later age. They also had fathers who were less educated and were more likely to be farmers, and resided in poorer-built dwellings.
In addition, we find little evidence that program schools induced student sorting in proximate government schools. As column (5) shows, mean characteristics of government-school students were largely similar across control and program villages, with the exception that government-school students in program villages were slightly older than their counterparts in control villages (and therefore in a slightly higher grade). This is presumably because some share of the younger children who would have otherwise enrolled in the government school absent the program selected the program school instead, skewing the age distribution slightly upwards.
To understand the determinants of the program-school effect on test scores, we estimate an educationproduction function, by regressing test scores (for students in all schools) on a set of school inputs, controlling for child characteristics. Table 10 reports estimates for total test scores; appendix table A4 reports estimates for subject test scores. The results support the findings discussed above. Specifically, school inputs significantly associated with test scores-such as the teacher's education and experience-are those which program schools exercise greater, independent control over than government schools. This finding holds even when we control for program schools in the estimations, indicating that the estimates of the education-production function are not capturing some unobserved feature of program schools with which they are correlated.
Efficiency
We 
while the corresponding first-order condition for the social planner is:
The difference between these two first-order conditions is the inclusion of the marginal social benefit. In our setting, that term is consumer surplus plus the social value of higher test scores. In general, the programschool operator will fail to provide the socially optimal level of inputs because he does not capture the complete rents generated by their provision. In contrast, the social planner will provide inputs if their marginal social benefit exceeds their cost.
Our exercise consists of four steps. First, we estimate a discrete choice model of household demand for schools (referred to as "child" demand); it allows us to compute both the expected distribution of school enrollment, which in turn determines school operator revenues; and consumer surplus under both observed and counterfactual school-input configurations. Second, we estimate the costs of providing school inputs using a simple revealed preference argument; it allows us to calculate the cost of providing such input configurations. Third, we estimate an education-production function relating test scores to school inputs; it allows us to calculate the counterfactual distribution of student test scores. Finally, we tie it all together with a calculation of the social value of school-input configurations that accounts for surplus accruing to students, school-operator profits, and the broader societal value of education.
We begin by estimating the demand for schooling by children in the villages. In turn, this allows us to evaluate how that surplus changes with changes in school characteristics. We model child demand for schools using a standard logit random utility framework. Each child makes a single choice from a set of schools, J,
where the utility of choice j 2 J to child i is given by:
where X ij is a vector of child characteristics and school inputs, is a vector of marginal utilities, and ✏ ij is an idiosyncratic shock distributed as Type I Extreme Value. We normalize the utility of not going to school to zero.
For the demand function estimation, we include a variety of school inputs and child characteristics shown to be important in the education-production literature (Todd and Wolpin, 2003) . Child characteristics consist of gender, age, distance from home to the school, and interactions between the child's gender and school inputs. School inputs consist of toilets or drinking water (a single indicator variable); as well as teacher characteristics, such as gender, teaching experience, frequency of absence from school, and time spent teaching. We also include interactions of school inputs with an indicator variable for female students, Table 11 reports the schooling-demand estimates. Column (1) reports results for a parsimonious specification; column (4) reports those from our richest specification, which includes interactions and an indicator variable for government schools. The coefficients have the expected signs. Looking at column (4), boys and older children were more likely to enroll in school. Children were more likely to enroll in school if it had toilets or drinking water, had lower fees, was closer to their homes, had teachers who spent more time teaching, and was not a government school. The coefficient on girls' interaction with the percentage of teachers who were female is large and statistically significant, indicating that the enrollment decision for girls was more sensitive to this dimension than that for boys.
The demand estimates capture children's willingness to pay for various school inputs. To understand the role of program schools in producing learning, we regress student test scores on the same school inputs to estimate an education-production function. Table 10 reports the results. Column (1) does not control for school type; column (2) includes an indicator variable for government schools; and column (3) includes an indicator variable for program schools. The key school inputs that influenced test scores were the percentage of teachers with less than five years of teaching experience, and the percentage of teachers with post-secondary education.
Next, we use the demand curve to estimate bounds on school-input costs. We focus on those inputs that are most relevant to the education-production function and that were under the control of the school operator: toilets or drinking water, the percentage of female teachers, percentage of more-educated teachers, and whether teachers were frequently absent. We assume that schools will provide an input, such as toilets or drinking water, if its cost did not exceed the additional revenue that it generates through increased enrollment. Likewise, for schools that did not provide the input, the opposite must be true. These two inequalities bound the cost of the input. This exercise requires the use of the structural model, since we need to recalculate the expected distribution of students across schools under a counterfactual set of inputs not observed in the data. Our demand model will also correct for the fact that in areas with competing schools, providing an additional input may not be as profitable as in other areas. Table 12 presents the results. The first input is toilets or drinking water. Demand is apparent in the costs incurred in providing these inputs. The next four inputs change the composition of teachers at the school. The first estimate reflects the cost of replacing a male teacher with a female teacher. Male students reacted negatively to the presence of a female teacher, while the opposite was true for female students. In combination with the number of boys and girls in each village, the sum of these forces implies that enrollment decreased when program schools substituted a female teacher for a male teacher. This, in turn, implies that female teachers must have been less costly than their male counterparts. Evidence for Pakistan is consistent with this finding. Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2008) find that female teachers in private schools earn 33-percent less than their male counterparts, after controlling for other characteristics. As might be expected, we also find that adding a teacher with post-secondary education was costly compared to adding one who was less educated, as was adding a teacher who was frequently absent; and adding a teacher with less than five years of teaching experience was less costly compared to adding one with more experience.
Combining these pieces allows us to address a key question: are program-school operators providing inputs that maximize child outcomes? To answer this question, we first parameterize the social welfare function:
where
is the sum of the consumer surplus over all children in the village, T C(x) is the (total) cost incurred in providing inputs and subsidies, and ⌧ g(x) is the social value of higher test scores.
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We assume that the social value of education is related to overall test scores, given by g(x), and a scalar multiplier, ⌧ .
The logit model provides a basis for computing the consumer welfare generated by the school. Following Small and Rosen (1981) , the compensating variation of choice set under the logit model is:
where ij (x) is the deterministic component of utility of student i choosing school j, ↵ is the disutility of school fees, and is Euler's constant. Our estimates above give the cost of each input, x.
The last component of our welfare analysis is the social benefits of education that are not internalized in the demand function. Since we do not know how exactly the social benefits of education, we choose to parameterize the social benefit function as h(x) = ⌧ g(x), where g(x) is the estimated education production function. This specification assumes that the social benefits of education are only a function of test scores, and captures the marginal (social) utility of higher test scores. This approach allows us to: first, solve the social planner's solution, as total benefits of providing inputs can be consistently compared with their costs; second, show how the social planner's solution to providing inputs changes with ⌧ , a parameter that we do not have measurements of; and, third, compute the relative efficiency of the observed allocation relative to what the social planner would have done.
The costs incurred in providing education are twofold. First, there is the direct cost of the inputs provided by program-school operators. Second, there is a deadweight loss due to the taxes necessary for providing subsidies to program-school operators. 13 To estimate the latter, we assume a deadweight loss of 30 percent, and multiply this by the total annual subsidy, which is a fixed per-student amount of 4,200 rupees per year under the gender-uniform subsidy treatment, which rises to 5,400 rupees per year for girls under the gender-differentiated one.
We define the social value of education as the product of the student's annual adult income and a social externality multiplier. To estimate the effect of education on labor earnings, based on estimates by 
where the subscript g indicates the gender of the child, and b the upper and lower bound estimates of wage gains. In rural Sindh, the baseline monthly wage (blwage) for men aged 15-34 is 6,600 rupees, and that for women in the same age group is 2,000 rupees; and labor force participation rates for the two are 80 percent and 36 percent, respectively. 14 We inflate the term with the multiplier above to account for social externalities.
For each program school in our sample, we solve the following social planner's problem:
computing all outcomes for all possible school-input configurations. This is computationally feasible since, by construction, there is only one program school in each village, and our structural model allows us to solve for enrollment, test scores, and profits for every possible input configuration in program schools. We assume that the inputs of other schools remained constant as the program school's inputs adjusted. We think this is reasonable, as the primary competition for most program schools were government schools, which were centrally regulated by provincial and district education administrations, and did not adjust inputs across program and control villages. Table 13 To understand why the social planner chooses these inputs, table 13 also reports the changes in consumer surplus, enrollment, input costs, and test scores. On average, the social planner chooses inputs that lower costs, in some cases dramatically. While total costs decrease, test scores increase dramatically. This results from higher school enrollment under the social planner, averaging 48 more students; and from higher test scores resulting from the interactions among teachers, other school inputs, and students. The better match quality between students and schools is reflected in the gains to consumer surplus, which are large and uniformly positive across all villages. Finally, higher test scores have substantial income effects, which directly translates into higher social welfare.
One of the key parameters in our social planner solution is the social value of education. This parameter does not come from any empirical or model-based foundation. Therefore, we are interested in understanding how robust our results are when we vary the social value of education. Columns (3)-(6) in table 13 report the results when the social planner places weights of 0, 0.5, 1.5, and 2, respectively, on test scores. The optimal education and teaching experience of teachers are invariant to the social value of education. In contrast, the optimal provision of toilets or drinking water falls, while the optimal levels of teacher absence and percentage of teachers who are female increase, as the social value of education falls to zero. Interestingly, the program configuration generates a social surplus closest to that achieved by the social planner when a weight of 1 is assigned by the latter to the social value of education.
Two aspects of the above calculations deserve emphasis. First, because men have higher labor force participation and labor earnings than women, factors improving enrollment and test scores for boys are given greater weight than those that raise them for girls. This can be seen most clearly with respect to female teachers, where increases in the social return to education lead to a decline in the optimal percentage of female teachers, which is driven by the lower preference for female teachers by boys. Because the model being used is static, it doesn't account for the possibility that the female labor earnings and labor force participation may increase over time, potentially due the very increase in education that is the subject of this study. Second, the social planner's solution is village-specific. This means that, while the statistics given in table 13 ostensibly indicate that program-school operators have provided inputs similar to those arrived at in the social planner's solution, the similarity in mean inputs does not necessarily imply that the village-specific solutions are similarly close.
Conclusion
The program evaluated in this study has proven remarkably effective in increasing school enrollment and test scores, measured after 1.5 school years. Introduced into educationally underserved villages, the program increased school enrollment by 30 percentage points, and total test scores by 0.63 standard deviations. For children induced by the program to enroll in school, the impact on total test scores was two standard deviations. Program impacts on school enrollment and test scores did not differ by gender, or by the subsidy treatment. We do not find that the gender-differentiated subsidy treatment had larger impacts on girls' enrollment or test scores than the gender-uniform one. Program-village households were more likely to express aspirations that their boys become doctors and engineers, rather than security personnel; and that their girls become teachers, rather than housewives. Program-village households also voiced a desire for their boys and girls to attain higher levels of education.
The study also assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of program schools. Consistent with existing evidence for Pakistan from larger, more-developed villages, we find that program-school students had higher test scores than government-school students, despite coming from more socioeconomically disadvantaged households. While program-school operators only captured profits through enrollment, the equilibrium social surplus is within 10 percentage points of the social planner. Compared to program-school operators, the social planner adjusts the gender ratio of teachers to better match the gender ratio of children in the village, ensures toilets and drinking water in the school, and hires less-experienced, but more-educated, teachers.
It is remarkable and reassuring that program-school operators have proven so successful in selecting the most-essential inputs for their schools. The results suggest that, when the government provides adequate support, enormous potential exists for local actors to find appropriate solutions to their challenges. (1) and (3) report mean child and household characteristics in control villages at baseline and follow-up, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) report differences in mean child and household characteristics in program villages at baseline and followup, respectively. treat_p denotes pooled treatment. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. Statistical significance at the one-, five-, and ten-percent levels denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Statistical significance at the one-, five-, and ten-percent levels denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. (4) report the intention-to-treat (ITT) impacts, with various sets of controls. Columns (5) and (6) report the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) impacts on test scores, based on reported and verified enrollment, respectively. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. Statistical significance at the one-, five-, and ten-percent levels denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. , with the full set of child and household controls and district fixed effects. treat_p denotes pooled treatment; treat_gu, the genderuniform subsidy treatment; and treat_gd, the gender-differentiated subsidy treatment. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. Statistical significance at the one-, five-, and ten-percent levels denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. This table reports gender-differential impacts on outcomes by subsidy treatment, with the full set of child and household controls and district fixed effects. treat_gu denotes the gender-uniform subsidy treatment; and treat_gd, the gender-differentiated subsidy treatment. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. Statistical significance at the one-, five-, and ten-percent levels denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. , with the full set of child and household controls and district fixed effects. Column (1) reports mean aspirations in control villages, and column (2) reports differences in mean aspirations between program and control villages. Columns (3), (4), and (5) report coefficients from a regressions of an indicator variable for girls, program status, and the interaction of the two. treat_p denotes pooled-treatment. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. Statistical significance at the one-, five-, and tenpercent levels denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. (1) and (4) report means for program schools; columns (2) and (5), differences in means between program and government schools; and columns (3) and (6), differences in means between program and private schools. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively. (2) , differences in means between program and government schools; column (3), differences in means between program and private schools; column (4), differences in means between government and private schools; and column (5), differences in means between government schools in program and control villages. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively. (2) , with an indicator variable for government schools; and column (3), with an indicator variable for program schools. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively. (3) report mean child and household characteristics in villages under the gender-uniform subsidy treatment at baseline and follow-up, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) report differences in mean child and household characteristics between villages under the gender-uniform and -differentiated subsidy treatments at baseline and follow-up, respectively. treat_gu denotes the gender-uniform subsidy treatment; and treat_gd, the gender-differentiated one. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. Statistical significance at the one-, five-, and ten-percent levels denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. schools under the gender-uniform and gender-differentiated subsidy treatments. The unit of observation is child-school. Columns (1) and (4) report means for program schools under the gender-uniform subsidy treatment; and columns (2) and (5), differences in means between program schools under the two subsidy treatments. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively. (2) , differences in means between program and government schools; column (3), differences in means between program and private schools; column (4), differences in means between government and private schools; and column (5), differences in means between government schools in program and control villages. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively. This table reports education production estimates, relating standardized subject test scores to school inputs and student characteristics, controlling for district fixed effects. Columns (1) through (3) report estimates for language test scores, and columns (4) through (6), estimates for mathematics test scores. Columns (1) and (4) report estimates without indicator variables for program or government schools; columns (2) and (5) with an indicator variable for government schools, and columns (3) and (6) with an indicator variable for program schools. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels, respectively.
